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Abstract 
 
Two hundred undergraduate and graduate students from the two English universities in 
Montreal participated in our experiments. Subjects participated in a contract negotiation 
between an artist and an entertainment company. They negotiated as representatives of 
the respective sides. The contract was comprised of 4 fixed issues to negotiate: number 
of promotional concerts, number of new songs, royalties for CDs and contract signing 
bonus. Each issue had a fixed number of options to choose from. A complete offer 
consists of selecting one option per issue. In total, there were 240 possible contracts. 
The experiments were conducted in a lab setting in which the interaction between the 
negotiation parties was computer-mediated via a web browser. Each dyad had one hour 
to negotiate a contract by exchanging messages and complete offers for acceptance. 
Participants were also asked to fill in a pre and post negotiation questionnaire. Each 
participant was paid $24 cash for a 3 hours session.  
 
 We have used a 2x2 factorial experiment design. One factor represents the 
availability of analytical support (AS) and the other the availability of quantitative 
information about the represented preferences. We note that we are not considering 
negotiations in which one of the sides has AS and the other has not. Thus, when AS is 
available or preference information is quantitatively given, it is for both parties in a 
negotiation. Each combination of one of the two levels per factor creates the four 
experimental treatments shown in Figure 1. Subjects were matched randomly in pairs 
and assigned to one of the experimental treatments. In total, we have obtained results for 
100 negotiations, 24 correspond for treatment T3, 23 for T4 and 21 for T6 and T1 each. 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental treatments  
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 An additive score system can be used to help participants in representing their 
preferences. A specific numerical value is assigned to each option of each issue. 
Contracts offers, constructed by selecting one option per issue, are scored adding their 
options scores to obtain an overall numerical value. For each treatment, subjects who 
reached the highest final contract score in comparison with those playing the same role 
had the opportunity to earn another $40 dollars extra. This reward mechanism was made 
clear to the subjects before the experiment in order to induce in the subjects a contract 
value maximizer behaviour. Thus, contracts with higher scores were preferred. The 
analytical support provided to each party in T4 and T6 consisted in the display of offers’ 
rating when making or receiving them, graphical information of the negotiation history 
and a post-settlement mechanism to improve a potential inefficient contract agreement.  
 
 Information regarding the preferences of the side represented by the participants 
was given in the confidential instructions. Quantitative information would be available 
when the numerical scores are enforcement in the set of instructions within the case 
description. Otherwise, subjects only receive verbal and visual information on the 
importance of issues and options but no rating values. Thus, preference information is 
quantified with numerical scores for treatment T3 and T6, whereas is qualitatively given 
for T1 and T4. This qualitative information tries to convey the deleted numbers used in 
the original quantitative version. Therefore, in T3 and T6 the importance that each side 
should give to the negotiated issues and their options is fixed, whereas in T1 and T4, 
when scores were not enforced, quantitative scores were elicitated by the subjects prior 
negotiation based on his understanding of the qualitative information received. A direct 
method for rating issues and options was used to elicitate their understanding of this 
preferences. Besides the system would use these scores during the negotiation to 
evaluate every contract when AS is available.  
 
 As depended variables we measure objective and subjective variables. Our 
experiments showed conclusively that analytical support lead to more efficient 
agreements. When analytical support was not available for both negotiators the 
agreements presented more variability and were more inefficient: the negotiated 
agreements felt far form the efficient frontier and negotiators left potential joint gains on 
the table. In general, AS provides better quality agreements.  
